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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARK D. LETHAM, 
Applicant and Appellant, 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
BIG BASIN ENTERPRISES, AND 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION FUND, 
Defendants and Respondents, 
Industrial Commission Case 
No. 87000671 
Administrative Law Judge: 
Gilbert A. Martinez 
Court of Appeals No.: 
88-0307-CA 
Certiorari Docket No.: 
890162 
Priority No. 13(b) 
BRIEF OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION OF UTAH, ET AL. 
IN OPPOSITION TO APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR WRIT 
OF CERTIORARI 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
This is a Workers' Compensation case. The applicant appeals 
from an Order Denying Motion for Review of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah (Appendix 4 hereto) and an Order of Affirmance 
by the Utah Court of Appeals (Appendix 1 hereto)• 
Though not determinative to the Court's granting of this 
Petition, it is of significance that none of the criteria of Rule 
46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure are met in this case. 
This case is not one in which: 
1. A conflict exists between decisions of different panels 
of the Court of Appeals; 
2. A decision of the Court of Appeals is in conflict with a 
decision of the Supreme Court; 
3. There is a departure by the Court of Appeals from 
accepted judicial proceedings; 
4. There is an important question of municipal, state or 
federal law not previously decided by the Supreme Court. 
The central issue is whether the applicant in this case 
should be awarded any further Workers' Compensation benefits. 
Appellant lists a number of issues in his Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari that can be narrowed to two. Though not stated in 
exactly this manner by applicant, they are: 
1. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the 
Findings of Fact of the Administrative Law Judge and the 
Industrial Commission or whether, to the contrary, the evidence 
supported an order in favor of Applicant for additional temporary 
total disability benefits and for permanent partial impairment 
benefits. (Appellant's Brief, pp 1-2, Issues I, II, III, IV, V.) 
2. Whether Applicant was entitled to have his case 
reviewed by a medical panel for evaluation of the medical issues. 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 14) 
GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION 
A. Defendants do not dispute the dates of the entry of the 
Court of Appeals decision nor extensions allowed to plaintiff for 
the filing of his brief. 
B. The Supreme Court "...has sole discretion in granting or 
denying a petition for writ of certiorari for the review of a 
Court of Appeals adjudication..." Section 78-2-2(5) U.C.A. 
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CONTROLLING STATUTES AND 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Authority determinative of the first issue is the Court of 
Appeals statement of the standard of review in American Roofing 
Co. v, Indus. Comm., 752 P.2d 912, 914 (Utah App. 1988) and the 
Supreme Court decisions cited therein. Also pertinent is Sec. 35-
1-88, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended). (Appendix 6 hereto) 
Authority determinative of the second issue discussed is the 
applicable version of Sec. 35-1-77, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as 
amended 1982) (Appendix 5 hereto). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves the denial of an employee's claims for 
additional temporary total disability benefits and for permanent 
impairment benefits* 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND 
DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW 
Applicant Mark D. Letham claimed benefits under Utah 
Workers1 Compensation Act. He alleged that he sustained injuries 
to his lower back from an industrial accident on March 19, 1985, 
and from a second industrial accident on February 10, 1986. 
(Record, pp. 2, 20, 30) 
A hearing was held on October 22, 1987, before Administrative 
Law Judge Gilbert A. Martinez. (Record, p. 270) The 
Administrative Law Judge found that Applicant's claim was not 
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credible or trustworthy and that Applicant was not entitled to any 
benefits in connection with either of the alleged industrial 
accidents. (Record/ p. 276) (Appendix 2 hereto) 
Applicant sought review November 9, 1987. The Administrative 
Law Judge issued a Supplemental Order on January 27, 1988. 
(Appendix 3 hereto) The judge reiterated his finding that 
Applicant's claim was not credible or trustworthy; and he again 
denied Applicant's claims for benefits. (Record, pp. 283-285) 
Applicant again sought review in February 1988. (Record, p. 
293) The Industrial Commission of Utah issued its Order Denying 
Motion for Review on April 15, 1988. (Appendix 4 hereto) In its 
Order, the Commission reversed the Administration Law Judge's 
finding that no compensable accident had occurred. It found the 
March 19, 1985, industrial accident to be fairly well documented, 
even though the alleged February 10, 1986, industrial accident was 
questionable. (Record, pp. 316-317) 
However, the Commission upheld the Administrative Law Judge's 
denial of further benefits. (Record, p. 317) The Commission 
agreed with the Administrative Law Judge that the medical evidence 
submitted was unreliable because Applicant had misrepresented his 
true physical condition to the physicians involved. (Record, p. 
316) It noted that substantial benefits had already been paid, 
and it agreed that the evidence showed that temporary total 
compensation was paid at a time when Applicant was medically 
stable* The Commission concluded that there had been an 
overpayment of temporary total compensation during a period when 
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Applicant had been medically stable and that this overpayment 
would offset any award for permanent impairment that might be 
warranted. (Record, p. 317) 
Applicant submitted a "Petition for Writ of Review" to the 
Court of Appeals on May 16, 1988; and the writ was issued May 23, 
1988. (Record, pp. 319-321, 322) On February 24, 1989, the Court 
of Appeals issued its Order of Affirmance. (Appendix 1 hereto) 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Applicant Mark D. Letham was an electrician employed by Big 
Basin Enterprises, a general contractor that did industrial 
electrical work in Utah. (Record, p. 19) He was hired in 
September 1985 and worked until an accident in March of that 
year. (Record, p. 20) 
On March 19, 1985, Applicant sustained an injury to his lower 
back when he and other workers tried to lift a large electrical 
cabinet on a job at Central Valley Water Treatment Plant in Salt 
Lake City. (Record, pp. 20-21) An ambulance was called; and 
Applicant was taken to St. Mark's hospital, where he was referred 
to a Dr. Robert Lamb. A CT Scan was taken, apparently showing 
only a slight bulge in one disc but nothing more. (Record, pp. 9, 
23, 46) 
Applicant was off work for about a month and a half following 
this incident, and he received benefits for this period. He 
returned to work in late April or May 1985, and he continued work 
until February 1986. (Record, pp. 23-24) 
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On February 10, 1986, Applicant allegedly sustained a second 
injury to his lower back at work. When he and three other men 
attempted to lift a steel highway grate, Applicant felt intense 
pain in his lower back. (Record, p. 30) The same day, Applicant 
saw Dr. Aaron Barson, an osteopath, in Ogden, Utah; and Dr. Barson 
instructed Applicant to stay off work. (Record, pp. 31-33) On 
February 12, 1986, a Dr. Walter Reichert took a repeat CT Scan 
showing no substantial changes from the previous CT Scan of March 
1985. (Record, p. 49) Dr. Barson treated Applicant with 
injections in his back for two to four months. (Record, pp. 30, 
50) 
Notwithstanding Applicant's alleged back problems, he 
attended the Fourteenth Annual Mountain Man Rendezvous at Fort 
Bridger, Wyoming, in August 1986, where the activities included 
putting up tepees, shooting black powder rifles and selling 
crafts. (Record, pp. 72-74, 79, 262-265, 275) Applicant 
testified that he earned $1,300 at the rendezvous by selling his 
craft wares. (Record, pp. 80, 275) 
Applicant was eventually referred to Dr. Peter Heilbrun, a 
neurosurgeon with University of Utah Neurosurgical Center, who 
then became his treating physician. (Record, pp. 9, 34) Initial 
treatment under Dr. Heilbrun consisted of bed rest and no lifting. 
In November 1986, Dr. Heilbrun had X-rays taken and decided that 
surgery was required. He performed a diskectomy or laminectomy on 
Applicant at the University of Utah Hospital on November 4, 1986. 
(Record, pp. 14, 34-36) 
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In December 1986, Applicant slipped and fell at home on his 
front porch. As a result of this fall, the "stitch work" from 
Applicant's surgery had to be repaired. Following this second 
surgery, Applicant was again prescribed bed rest and no lifting. 
(Record, pp. 14, 38-39) 
Applicant last saw Dr. Heilbrun in June or July of 1987. 
Applicant returned to work in August 1987 as an employee of USA 
Cable Connection. He has worked regularly ever since. (Record, 
pp. 40-41) 
Within the first three months after his repair surgery, 
Applicant was able to do yard work, carry garbage cans out to the 
street, and the like. (Record, pp. 58-59) On or about May 2, 
1987, Applicant was observed and videotaped putting up a 20-foot 
tepee, carrying a bag of tepee canvas weighing approximately 65 
pounds, carrying large boxes, and engaging in other strenuous 
activities at Fort Buenaventura in Ogden, Utah. (Record, pp. 68-
70, 235-237, 273-274) During the first week of June 1987, 
Applicant went on a gold-panning expedition in the San Gabriel 
mountains in California. (Record, pp. 69-70, 87-89) Videotape 
showed this to involve activities such as shoveling dirt, 
carrying five-gallon buckets of water and of dirt, climbing up and 
down hills, and pulling a wheel barrel containing several five-
gallon buckets full of dirt up a mountain slope. (Record, pp. 
237-240, 274-275) There is also evidence that Applicant was 
engaged in some construction work for the Dean's Hungry Eye 
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Restaurant, 4700 South and State Street, Salt Lake City, during 
part of May 1987. (Record, p. 71, 284) 
During these periods of physical activity, Applicant claimed 
that he v/as, nevertheless, seriously incapacitated with his lower-
back condition* Medical reports show that Applicant continued to 
claim problems with his back during this period. 
On March 2, 1987, Dr. Heilbrun reported: "He generally is 
improving but continues to have this sharp pain in his back in 
various positions. I could not find evidence of abnormality on 
flexion and extension films." (Record, p. 107) Dr. Heilbrun 
reported on April 27, 1987: "The patient is unchanged in that he 
continues to have intermittent sharp pain in the back in the area 
of the incision . . . ." (Record, p. 162) 
On May 22, 1987, Applicant's physical therapist, Kurt Dudley, 
wrote: 
He returned to our clinic on 5-18-87, for 
re-evaluation. I tested him on most of his 
functional skills. His subjective complaints 
of pain, I feel, have remained about the same. 
He continues to complain of low back pain 
which is centered in the middle of his back. 
He has some groin pain and some buttock pain. 
When asked what is the heaviest object he has 
lifted in the last few months, he reported he 
had not lifted anything heavier than a 
"grocery bag." He also reports, "I can 
mow the lawn, but it will usually out me 
down." 
My overall impression is that the 
patient's subjective complaint is the major 
focus of disability. 
(Record, p. 182, 184) (emphasis added) 
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Finally, in his letter of July 8, 1987, Dr. Sherman Coleman 
stated: 
This young man's current complaints consist of 
a "snapping in his back" which is located in 
the center of the lower portion, and pain that 
accompanies the snapping that radiates down as 
far as his knees bilaterally. He says he has 
an occasional pain in his groin. He has not 
been able to return to work since his "injury" 
in March 1986 . . . . 
(Record, p. 105) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
The argument is that the Commission had ample evidence upon 
which to base its decision and that its decision was a reasonable 
one in light of the many heavy physical activities Applicant was 
undertaking while reporting to his physicians symptoms 
incompatible with his activity level. 
POINT II 
Sec. 35-1-77 Utah Code Ann. 1953 (as amended 1982) (Appendix 
5 hereto), makes it clear that the Commission has full discretion 
about whether or not to convene a medical panel in a given case; 
and, therefore, the Commission did not err in not referring the 
medical issues to a medical panel in this case. There was 





THE COMMISSION HAD SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
SUPPORT ITS ORDER AND DID NOT ACT IN AN 
ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS MANNER AS SO FOUND BY 
THE COURT OF APPEALS, 
In Points I, II and III of Appellantfs Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, Appellant raises issues concerning the sufficiency of 
the evidence. 
Concerning issues of evidence, the standard of review has 
been stated recently in American Roofing Co. v. Indus. Coinm., 752 
P.2d 912, 914 (Utah App. 1988) which cites liberally to decisions 
of this Court: 
In reviewing a decision by the Commission/ 
"this Court will not disturb the findings and 
orders of the Commission unless they are 
arbitrary and capricious, and they are 
arbitrary and capricious when they are 
contrary to the evidence or without any 
reasonable basis in the evidence." Rushton v. 
Gelco Express, 732 P.2d 109f 111 (Utah 1986). 
Another statement of the standard of review is found in Peck v. 
Eimco Process Equipment Co., 748 P.2d 572 , 575 (Utah 1987): 
In reviewing the evidentiary basis for 
findings of fact made by the Industrial 
Commission/ this Court inquires only whether 
the Commission's findings are supported by 
substantial evidence. Bigfootfs Inc. v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 714 P.2d 1152, 1153 (Utah 
1986) . 
The Commission's findings are, indeed, amply supported by 
substantial evidence and that the Commission's findings are not 
arbitrary or capricious. 
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At Points I and II, Appellant relies entirely on the evidence 
of Dr. Peter Heilbrun. Dr. Heilbrun was one of Applicant's 
attending physicians. In a letter dated November 6, 1987, Dr. 
Heilbrun assigns Applicant a release date of August 22, 1987, and 
an impairment rating of 15% of whole man. (Record, p. 282) At 
Point I, Appellant claims, "No medical evidence was introduced to 
refute these medical claims." 
Medical Evidence. First, it should be noted that the 
Commission is not required to give any special weight to the 
evidence of the attending physician. In Rushton v. Gelco Express, 
732 P.2d 109 (Utah 1986), the applicant claimed benefits for a 
knee condition which her attending physician believed was caused 
by an industrial accident. According to the applicant in that 
case, the Administrative Law Judge was required to give preference 
to the findings of the treating physician. This contention 
however, was flatly rejected by the Supreme Court. 732 P.2d at 
111-112. 
Second, Appellant's Brief gives the impression that there was 
no medical evidence to support Defendants' side of this case; but 
that is incorrect. 
There are CT Scan reports of March 19, 1985, and February 
12, 1986. Both reports mention only a small disk bulge that does 
not displace any nerve roots. (Record, pp. 112, 118) 
There is evidence from Dr. Robert Lamb. In his notes of 
April 16, 1985, he states: "I think that his back discomfort 
depends on his ability to improve his posture." (Record, p. 120) 
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His diagnosis was: "Possible central disk protrusion and acute 
lumbar strain." (Record, p. 121, 123) 
In March, 1986, Dr. Aaron Barson stated that he did not think 
Applicant's back condition warranted surgery. (Record, p. 131) 
There is also the letter of Dr. Gerald F. Vanderhooft, May 
14, 1986, in which he confirms the diagnosis of Dr. Lamb that 
Applicant had "a lumbar sprain syndrome without significant disk 
herniation." (Record, p. 101) Dr. Vanderhooft states: 
This man had what appears to be a reasonable 
industrial accident in March of 1985. He then 
improved in a reasonable amount of time and 
returns to work and six months later while 
doing ordinary work that is expected of him, 
he starts having back pain again. In the 
meantime# the evaluation has ruled out any 
significant intervertebral disc herniation. 
He has not then nor is he now a candidate for 
surgery. Enzyme injections in the disc space 
and surgery are both contraindicated in my 
opinion. 
(Record, p. 102, emphasis added) Dr. Vanderhooft attributed 
Applicant's back problems primarily to his sway back, and Dr. 
Vanderhooft's evaluation was that "this man has no permanent 
impairment." (Record, p. 103) 
In short, there was sufficient medical evidence in the record 
from which the Commission could reasonable have inferred an 
alternative theory of the case. The evidence supports 
conclusions that Applicant did no more than "sprain" his back in 
the March 1985 and/or February 1986 industrial accidents and that 
the herniated disk, which Dr. Heilbrun repaired in the November 
1986 surgery, was the result of some non-industrial accident that 
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occurred after the CT Scans of March 1985 and February 1986 or was 
the result of a nonindustrial, postural problem. 
Non-medical evidence. In addition to medical evidence, the 
Commission had a good deal of non-medical evidence bearing on 
Applicant's condition, namely, the video tape of Applicant's 
mountainman activities and the testimony of the investigators who 
did the taping. 
It is not true, as Appellant seems to suggest, that the 
Commission is bound to consider only medical evidence (evidence 
from medical authorities) in making determinations about an 
applicant's alleged injury. (See appellant's arguments and 
comments at pages 1, 3, 4 and 8 of his brief discussing Section 
35-1-66 U.C.A. which statute is attached hereto as Appendix 9) 
Section 35-1-88, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended) (attached 
hereto as Appendix 6), makes it clear that the Commission may 
receive any evidence (medical or non-medical) that is material and 
relevant for proof of any fact (medical or non-medical). Section 
35-1-88 states in part: 
The Commission may receive as evidence and use 
as proof of any fact in dispute all evidence 
deemed material and relevant . . . ." 
(Emphasis added) See also, Rushton v. Gelco Express, 739 P.2d 
109, 111-112 (Utah 1986). Moreover, the Commission is not 
required to accept opinions of medical experts and may, in fact, 
find contrary to the only medical evidence received. Griffith v. 
Indus. Comm., 754 P.2d 981 (Utah App. 1988); Rushton v. Gelco 
Express, 732 P.2d 109 (Utah 1986); Shipley v. C & W Contracting 
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Co., 528 P.2d 153 (Utah 1974). See also: Larson, Workmen's 
Compensation Law, Vol. 3, Sec. 79, "Evidence." 
The Court should further note that medical evidence is only 
as probative as the foundational history provided the physician. 
Unfortunately, the appellant has been found by the trier of facts 
to have decimated that foundation by his misrepresentations as to 
his condition. That is the fatal flaw in his case. He simply 
was not believed by the trier of facts. 
Appellant's claims for additional temporary total disability 
benefits and permanent partial impairment benefits are based on 
Dr. Heilbrun's letter of November, 1987. Appellant suggests in 
his brief that there was no other acceptable evidence (i.e., 
medical evidence) upon which the Commission could have based 
contrary findings. Yet, the video tape of Applicant's mountainman 
activities provided material and relevant evidence concerning 
Applicant's condition. This evidence was perfectly acceptable, 
non-medical evidence. Thus, the Commission had substantial 
evidence to support its Order. 
Credibility. Furthermore, the Commission's assessment of the 
evidence presented, both medical and non-medical, must be 
considered in light of the concern over credibility, which arose 
in this case. Under the applicable standard of review, the 
reviewing court "has no power to determine the weight of the 
evidence and credibility of the witnesses . . . " Bigfoot's Inc. 
v. Indus. Comm., 714 P.2d 1152, 1153 (Utah 1986); Staker v. Indus. 
Comnu, 61 Utah 11, 209 P. 880 (1922). 
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In his Supplemental Order, the Administrative Law Judge 
stated that "there existed a serious issue of credibility 
regarding the claim of the applicant." The Administrative Law 
Judge found "that the applicant's claim is not credible and 
trustworthy." (Record, p. 284) In its Order, the Commission 
agreed with these findings and pointed out that some of the 
medical reports of treating physicians were poisoned because they 
simply recounted what Applicant had inaccurately reported to them. 
...The Commission agrees with the 
Administrative Law Judge that, per the video 
tape, temporary total compensation was paid at 
a time when the applicant was clearly 
medically stable. The Commission also agrees 
that the medical evidence that has been 
submitted is somewhat unreliable as the 
applicant clearly was misrepresenting to the 
doctor or doctors involved as to what his true 
physical condition was. 
(Record, p. 316) (See Appendix 4 page 2 of the Order) 
Liberal construction. Finally, Appellant cites a number of 
cases at Point III in his brief for the proposition that doubts on 
close questions concerning the evidence should be resolved in 
favor of the applicant. (Appellantfs Brief, p. 13) The answer to 
this is simply that neither the Administrative Law Judge nor the 
Commission found the disputed factual issues to be close 
questions, and the available evidence certainly makes clear that 
such an assessment was reasonable. Further, the standard of 
review of issues of fact is to "...defer the Commission's Findings 
of Facts unless it makes findings not supported by substantial 
evidence (citations omitted.)" Bennett v. Industrial Commission, 
726 P.2d 427 (Utah 1986) at 429. Mr. Letham fails to recognize 
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that substantial evidence in the record supports the Commission's 
Order. 
It might also be noted that all the cases cited by Appellant 
speak of doubts concerning construction of workers' compensation 
statutes or acts being decided in favor of the applicant—not 
questions of fact. Presumably, the facts should be ascertained 
first, and only then should the relevant statutes be interpreted 
and applied. The central disputes in this case have been over 
factual issues regarding Applicant's condition and credibility and 
not over points of statutory interpretation. 
Considering the problems with Applicant's credibility and 
considering all the medical and non-medical evidence presented to 
the Commission, it is clear that the Commission's findings were 
not arbitrary and capricious and that, to the contrary, they were 
amply supported by the evidence. 
POINT II 
THE COMMISSION'S DECISION CONCERNING THE 
CALLING OF A MEDICAL PANEL IS ENTIRELY 
DISCRETIONARY UNDER THE 1982 AMENDMENT TO 
SECTION 35-1-77 U.C.A. AND THE COMMISSION DID 
NOT COMMIT ERROR WHEN IT DID NOT CONVENE A 
MEDICAL PANEL. 
In Point II of Appellant's Brief, Mr. Letham asserts that it 
was "mandatory" that the Commission refer the case to a medical 
panel, if it chose not to accept the treating physician's reports. 
In support of his position, Appellant refers to Section 35-1-77 
and cites Schmidt v. Indus. Comm., 617 P.2d 693 (Utah 1983). 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 12) Indeed former Section 35-1-77 U.C.A. 
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made such a referral mandatory. The 1982 amendment, however, 
substituted "may" for "shall" in the first sentence, thus giving 
the Commission complete discretion concerning the appointment of 
medical panels. The relevant portion of the current version of 
Sec. 35-1-77 reads as follows: 
(1) (a) Upon the filing of a claim for 
compensation for injury by accident, or for 
death, arising out of or in the course of 
employment, and if the employer or its 
insurance carrier denies liability, the 
commission may refer the aspects of the case 
to a medical panel ....(emphasis added) 
The case of Schmidt v. Indus. Comm., cited by Appellant, refers to 
the pre-1982 version of Sec. 35-1-77. See 617 P.2d at 695-696. 
The Utah Supreme Court has confirmed that the Commission now has 
complete discretion as to whether a case is referred to a medical 
panel. Moore v. American Coal Co., 737 P.2d 989 (Utah 1987); 
Champion Home Builders v. Indus. Comm., 703 P.2d 306-308 (Utah 
1985). 
It is abundantly clear that the appointment of a medical 
panel by the Commission is no longer mandatory. Accordingly, the 
Commission did not commit error when, in its sound discretion, it 
decided not to appoint a medical panel in this case. 
Letham also states that the Commission should have either 
accepted his treating physicians' analysis or referred the medical 
issues to a medical panel. As argued previously herein, the 
weight of that evidence was so lightened by its foundational 
weakness so as to be of no value to the Commission. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Order of Affirmance of the Court of Appeals is based on 
sound grounds. There is no special reason for this Court to grant 
the Petition for Writ of Certiorari. The Order of the Commission 
should be affirmed. There is no error of law. The factual 
findings were not arbitrary and capricious with no foundation in 
fact. The findings of the Administrative Law Judge and the 
Commission are amply supported by substantial evidence in the 
record bearing on Applicant's credibility and his medical 
condition. The Commission was well within the bounds of its 
reasonable discretion when it decided not to appoint a medical 
panel. 
The basic case presented to the reviewing courts is a 
reargument of facts that have been found against Mr. Letham at 
every review level. The appellant is dissatisfied with the 
Industrial Commission's findings. The appellant is dissatisfied 
with the Court of Appeals order sustaining the Commission. This 
Court is being asked to reweigh the facts. That is not the role 
of an appellate court. 
Accordingly, Defendants respectfully request this Court to 
deny the Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
DATED this ^ 7 day of May, 1989. 
James R. Black 
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APPENDIX 1 
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE, UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
F I L E D 
FEB 2^989 
Mark D. Letham, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
Board of Review of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 
Big Basin Ent. and Workers 
Compensation Fund, 
Defendants. 
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE 
Case No, 880307-CA 
Before Judges Bench, Garff and Dee (Senior District Judge 
Sitting by Special Assignment) (On Rule 31 Hearing). 
The order of the Industrial Comraision is supported by 
competent evidence and is not arbitrary or capricious. The 
order is affirmed. , 
DATED this £f~ ^day of February, 1989. 
FOR THE COURT: 
M>^*^/-^ 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
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FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
CASE No. 87000671 
MARK D. LETHAM, 
Applicant, 
vs, 
BIG BASIN ENT and/or 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH, 
Defendants.-


















FINDINGS OF FACT 





Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on October 22, 
1987, at 8:30 a.m,; same being pursuant to Order and 
Notice of the Commission. 
Gilbert A. Martinez, Administrative Law Judge. 
The applicant was present and represented by Keith E. 
Sohm9 Attorney at Law. 
The defendants were represented by Burton K. Brasher, 
Attorney at Law. 
At the commencement, of the hearing, the parties set forth the issues 
to be resolved by the Administrative Law Judge, which include the following: 
1. Whether or not the applicant's claim is credible and 
trustworthy? 
2. Whether or not there is a direct medical causal rela-
tionship between the applicants low back problems and 
the alleged industrial accidents? 
MARK D. LETHAM 
FINDINGS AND ORDER 
PAGE TWO 
3, Whether or not the applicant's low back problems 
occurred as a result of non-industrial events occurr-
ing after the industrial accidents? 
4, Whether or not the applicant was temporarily and tot-
ally disabled during the period of May 30, 1987, to 
and including August 22, 1987? 
5, Whether or not the applicant, in fact, sustained a 
permanent partial disability as a result of his 
alleged industrial accidents? 
6, Whether or not the applicant was injured by accident 
arising out of or in the course of employment on 
February 10, 1986? 
7, Attorney's fees and interest pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 35-1-78 and 35-1-87. 
This is a claim for benefits under the Utah Worker's Compensation 
Act. Pursuant to the Application for Hearing, the applicant alleges that he 
sustained an injury to his low back by accident arising out of or in the 
course of employment with the defendant employe on March 19, 1985, and from a 
second accident occurring on February 10, 1986. 
The defendant employer has raised several defenses,' as follows: 
1. That the applicant did not injure his low back during 
the course of employment on either March 19, 1985, or 
February 10, 1986; 
2. That the applicant's low back injuries resulted from 
non-industrial events occurring after these alleged 
industrial accidents; 
3. That the applicant did not sustain a permanent partial 
disability as a direct result of either of these two 
industrial accidents, according to Dr. Gerard F. 
Vanderhooft; 
4. That the applicant's testimony is not credible and 
trustworthy that he was temporarily and totally 
disabled or that he sustained a permanent partial 
the t8epe!fsability a t a n y t i m e' 
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Based upon the testimony of the various witnesses at the time of the 
hearing, including the videotape demonstrating the applicant involved in heavy 
physical exertion, and good cause appearing herein, the Administrative Law 
Judge finds as follows. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
.... ,
At t n e t3jne o f t h e
 formal hearing, the defendants attacked the credi-
bility of the applicant's claim. The defendants presented clear and convinc-
ing evidence to establish that the applicant was not temporarily and totally 
disabled at any time after May 2, 1987. Furthermore, the defendants presented 
clear and convincing evidence to support that the applicant did not sustain a 
permanent partial disability in his low back from an industrial accident 
occurring on either March 19, 1985, or February 10, 1986. 
Under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act the applicant carries the 
burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence that he sustained an 
injury by accident during the course of employment, which is compensable under 
the Act. Furthermore, the applicant carries the burden of prcrf of establish-
i n s
,
t h a t h e was
 totally and temporarily disabled as a result of the industrial 
accident and that he sustained a permanent partial disability. In those cases 
where the industrial injury is suspect, the Administrative Law Judge has the 
discretion of giving whatever weight is reasonable to the testimony of the 
applicant -regarding his claim. Let the record show that the Administrative 
Law Judge also has the discretion of not accepting the testimony of the 
applicant when the credibility of the applicant is attacked, and where there 
is substantial evidence to show that the applicant did not remain temporarily 
and totally disabled after May 2, 1987, or that he sustained a permanent 
partial disability from the alleged industrial incidents. 
^ In the case, at bar, there exists a serious issue of credibility 
regarding the claim of the applicant. The applicant claims that he was 
temporarily and totally disabled and that he sustained a permanent partial 
disability as a result of his two industrial accidents. However, the evidence 
does not support the applicant's claim for benefits. At the hearing, the 
defendants presented evidence that was clear and convincing that the applicant 
had no physical limitations during the periods of time that he is claiming 
that he was totally disabled. 
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Dennis Dye, investigator for Intel Tech Services, testified at the 
hearing that he conducted a surveillance of the applicant in this matter, Mark 
D. Latham, on May 2, 1987, and'again on June 5, 1987, and June 7, 1987. 
During this surveillance, Mr. Dye used a professional camera to visually tape 
the physical activities of the applicant during the periods that he was 
claiming that he was totally disabled. At the hearing, a videotape was 
presented into evidence and was shown to demonstrate that the applicant had no 
physical limitations following his industrial injuries. See the Fuji 
Videocassette marked: "Mark Letham, Hearing Tape." 
After viewing the videotape at the hearing, the Administrative Law 
Judge finds that the applicant was not temporarily and totally disabled from 
May 2, 1987, to August 22, 1987. In this regard, the Administrative Law Judge 
questions whether or not the applicant was temporarily and totally disabled 
before May 2, 1987, when he was receiving temporary total disability compen-
sation. Furthermore, the Administrative Law Judge finds that the applicant 
did not sustain a permanent physical impairment or disability as a direct 
result of either the alleged industrial accidents of March 19, 1985, or 
February 10, 1986. 
The videotape demonstrating the physical activities of the applicant 
demonstrated that he was physically capable of setting up and dismantling a 
teepee on or about May 2, 1987, and that the applicant was physically capable 
of mining for gold in the mountains of San Gabriel in the State of California 
on June 5, 1987, and June 7, 1987. This videotape demonstrated the following: 
1. That on or about May 2, 1987, the applicant was engaged in 
setting up a 20 foot teepee. In order to do so, the 
applicant was engaged in bending, carrying, and raising 
teepee poles. The applicant carried a sack of a teepee 
'canvas on his shoulder from his truck to the place he was 
setting up the teepee. The applicant wrapped the canvas 
around the poles and tied it down with a rope. During this 
process, the applicant ran back and forth from the teepee 
to the truck and climbed up onto the truck to get material 
and poles. furthermore, the applicant carried two large 
boxes, singlehandedly, from the truck to the teepee. Sub-
sequently, the applicant was observed carrying a very large 
box from the truck to the teepee. These boxes contained 
equipment belonging to the applicant and some of his mer-
chandise that he would sell as part of his business 
entitled, RamCo Enterprise. Included in this merchandise 
was furs and other leather goods. During the installation 
of the teepee, the applicant was observed to climb up and 
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down the boxes to tie down the canvas on the teepee poles. 
Furthermore, the applicant was observed to climb up and 
down his truck removing equipment from the truck to set up 
the teepee* Dennis Dye, investigator, testified at the 
hearing that the applicant was engaged in the physical 
activities of setting up the teepee during a one and one-
half hour period. Furthermore, Mr. Dye testified that the 
applicant completely dismantled the teepee and that it took 
him 45 minutes to do so. From the videotape, one could 
observe the applicant carrying equipment to his truck, 
loading the truck with equipment, and tying down the truck 
with a rope.The applicant would be on the floor, pulling on 
a rope and- rocking the truck, as he tied down the rope. 
All of these activities clearly established that the 
applicant was not totally and temporarily disabled at that 
time. 
2. On or about June 5, 1987, Dennis Dye, private investigator, 
taped the applicant in the mountains of San Gabriel, 
California. At that time, the applicant was demonstrating 
techniques of panning for gold. The videotape presented at 
the hearing clearly establishes that the applicant had no 
physical limitations u:.d no problems with movement involv-
ing his low back* Furthermore, the tape demonstrates no 
weakness in the applicant. The Administrative Law Judge 
observed from the film that the applicant was extremely 
active in performing unusual and extraordinary exertions. 
The applicant was observed carrying large equipment and 
climbing up and down hills. Furthermore, the applicant 
climbed up steep rocks. At other points in the film, the 
'applicant was observed running up and down the hillside. 
As part of the search for gold, the applicant was shoveling 
loads of dirt and carrying 5-gallon buckets containing dirt 
and other material. At no time did it appear that the 
applicant was having any physical problems with his low 
back. In addition, the applicant was observed to be seated 
in a squatting position along the river panning for gold. 
Dennis Dye, investigator, testified at the hearing that the 
applicant would be in these positions for two or three 
hours without any observation of pain problems in the low 
back. While the applicant was in the river mining for 
gold, he was observed to be lifting gallons of water and 
pouring it into a mining machine. Again, the applicant^did 
not appear to have any physical limitations in performing 
this activity. As part of the tape, the applicant was 
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observed carrying heavy rocks and lifting and carrying 
buckets of water and dirt in 5-gallon buckets. Of all of 
the activities that was most impressive, it was when the 
applicant and his partner, allegedly his brother, were 
pulling a wheelbarrow up the side of a mountain slope 
containing several of these 5-gallon buckets containing 
dirt in them. During this extreme amount of exertion, the 
applicant showed no ill effects in his low back. At the 
times that the applicant climbed up and down the mountain 
slopes and ran up and down the hillsides, he showed no 
physical limitations and weaknesses in his low back. 
3. On June 7, 1987, the applicant was again panning for gold 
in the mountains of San Gabriel, California. Again, the 
applicant was involved in extremely physical exertion, 
which included bending, squatting, lifting, climbing up and 
down hills, lifting buckets of water and dirt, and carrying 
large equipment. At one point, it was impressive that the 
applicant was able to demonstrate such physical strength in 
pulling a wheelbarrow up the side of a hill. Because of 
the terrain involved, the applicant and his brother could 
no longer pull on the wheelbarrow and therefore lifted the 
wheelbarrow and carried it up the side of the hill. Such 
over exertion demonstratec that the applicant was having no 
low back problems, and that he was physically strong in 
performing these and other activities. 
Let the record show that the videotape containing the physical 
activities^ of the applicant on May 2, 1987, when he was setting up the teepee, 
and the two days in June of 1987, when he was mining for gold in the State of 
California, cqjitains 38 to 40 minutes of the applicant performing heavy and 
unusual exertion. The defendants stated for the record that they have six 
hours of videotape involving the applicant, which was condensed down to the 38 
minute tape that was presented at the hearing. See the Fuji videocassette 
marked as "Mark Letham, Hearing Tape.** 
Randy Moser, private investigator, testified at the hearing that the 
applicant informed him toward the end of May of 1987, that he was performing 
construction work in the remodeling of a restaurant, entitled: Dean's Hungry 
Guy. The defendants also presented evidence showing that while the applicant 
was receiving compensation for temporary total disability, the applicant 
appeared on TV commercials for Lagoon. Furthermore, the applicant appeared in 
the September, 1986, issue of People Magazine. In that magazine, the appli-
cant was involved in the Fourteenth Annual Mountain Man Rendezvous in Fort 
Bridger, Wyoming. See Exhibit "D-2". The applicant testified at the hearing 
that he earned $1,300 at ttiat rendezvous by selling his wares, which included 
mountain furs and leather. 
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Regarding the applicant's claim that he was temporarily and totally 
disabled during the year of 1987, Curt Dudley, physical therapist from the 
Cottonwood Back Institute, testified at the hearing that, in his opinion, the 
applicant overly exaggerated his pain problems during the time that he was 
being treated at the Cottonwood Back Institute in February and March of 1987. 
Mr- Dudley testified that the applicant was not very cooperative during the 
physical therapy training and that he missed several of the treatments. Mr. 
Dudley testified that he saw the applicant in May of 1987, when the applicant 
appeared to be limping at that time and complaining of pain. This, of course, 
was the month that the applicant was involved in setting up and dismantling 
the teepee. From a credibility standpoint, it appears that the applicant was 
physically capable of performing physical activities requiring unusual and 
extraordinary exertion in performing his hobby and commercial projects as a 
mountaineer, but would appear before his physical therapist with low back 
pains and limp in front of the physical therapist during the times he was 
involved with installing teepees. This is totally inconsistent with the 
applicant's physical capabilities, as demonstrated by the videotape presented 
at the hearing. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The applicant in this matter is not entitled to workers' compensation 
benefits as a result of an alleged industrial accident occurring on either 
March 19, 1985, or February 10, 1986. 
The applicant's claim for additional compensation and medical bene-
fits shall be: denied on the basis that the applicant's claim is not credible 
and trustworthy. The Administrative Law Judge does not have to address the 
other issues presented above, the testimony and evidence presented at the 
hearing, specifically the videotape demonstrating the physical activities of 
tfie applicant, is clear and convincing evidence that the applicant's claim is 
not credible and trustworthy. This ruling is based upon the Findings of Fact 
herein, and that the record clearly establishes that the credibility of the 
applicant is suspect and not trustworthy. 
It should be pointed out for the record that the applicant has been 
paid substantial benefits regarding these alleged claims. The record shows 
that the defendants have paid benefits amounting to over $51,000. Temporary 
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total disability of $20,782.57 was paid at the rate of $272*00 per week from 
March 20
 f 1985, to May 27, 1985, and again from February 11, 1986, to May 29, 
1987* Furthermore, the defendants have paid medical expenses amounting to 
$31,286, this includes low back surgery performed on November 4, 1986, and on 
December 9, 1986* The facts in this case would, however, establish that these 
two surgeries were not necessitated by either of the industrial accidents. 
This is especially true of the second surgery performed on December 9, 1986, a 
couple of days after the applicant slipped and fell onto his low back at home 
on his front porch* The Administrative Law Judge makes no formal ruling in 
this regard* There exists a serious question regarding medical causation 
between these two surgeries and the alleged industrial incidents* Further-
more, the Administrative Law Judge makes no specific ruling regarding whether 
the applicant was improperly paid temporary total disability compensation 
during the calendar year of 1987* These benefits have been gratuitously paid, 
although they do not appear to be supported by the evidence in the case. 
It is most likely that the applicant in this matter, Mark D. Letham, 
has received a windfall in this case. The amounts of $20,782.57 in compensa-
tion and $31,286.00 in medical expenses is probably more than what the 
applicant is rightfully entitled to* At this time, the applicant is gainfully 
employed by U*S*A* Cable Network and is not entitled to any additional 
benefits, pursuant to the above Findings of Fact. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant's claim for additional 
temporary total disability compensation shall be, and the same is hereby, 
denied. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the applicant's claim for permanent 
partial disability compensation shall be, and the same is hereby, denied. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the applicant's claim for additional 
medical expenses shall be, and the same is hereby, denied. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the applicant's claim for attorney fees 
and interest shall be, and the same is hereby, denied. 
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IT ' IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for^  review of the foregoing 
shall be filed in writing Within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof, 
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so 
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
Gilbert A. Martinez 
Administrative Law Judg 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
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Defendants. * 
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HEARING: Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on October 22, 
1987 at 1:00 p.m. o'clock. Said hearing was pursuant 
to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
BEFORE: Gilbert A. Martinez, Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The applicant was present and represented by Keith E. 
Sohm, Attorney at Law. 
The defendants were represented by Burton. K. Brasher, 
Attorney at Law. 
At the commencement of the hearing, the parties set forth the issues 
to be resolved by the Administrative Law Judge, which included the following 
issue as being the most significant issue in the case. 
1. Whether or not the applicant's claim is credible and 
trustworthy. 
On November 3, 1987, the Administrative Law Judge issued a Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, denying the applicant's claim for 
additional benefits. The Administrative Law Judge ruled that the applicant's 
claim for additional compensation and medical expenses are denied on the basis 




On November 10, 1987, the applicant, by and through legal counsel, 
filed a -Motion for Review" with the Industrial Commission of Utah. The 
applicant respectively requested 30 days in which to file a brief in the 
matter. On or about January 5, 1988, the applicant filed a "Applicant's Brief 
on Motion for Review**. In the brief, the applicant alleges that the 
Administrative Law Judge erred in making up findings that were improper 
inaccurate and contrary to the evidence. 
The Administrative Law Judge does not. agree* The testimony presented 
at the hearing by the witnesses, including Dennis Dye, investigator for Intel 
Tec Services and Randy Moser, investigator, clearly establishes that the 
applicant's claim is not credible and trustworthy. 
In the case at bar, there existed a serious issue of credibility 
regarding the claim of the applicant. During the period that the applicant 
alleged that he was temporarily and totally disabled, the defendants presented 
evidence to clearly establish that the applicant was physically capable of 
performing physical activities requiring heavy exertion, including the setting 
up and dismanteling a teepee and the physical performance of mining for gold 
in the mountains of San Gabrial, California. Randy Moser, private 
investigator, testified at the hearing that the applicant informed him in May 
of 1987, that the applicant was performing construction work in the romodeling 
of a restaurant, during a period that he was claiming that he was temporarily 
totally disabled. The defendants also presented evidence showing that while 
the applicant was receiving compensation for temporary total disability, the 
applicant appeared in T.V. commercials for Lagoon. Furthermore, the applicant 
appeared in the September, 1986, issue of People* s Magazine. In that 
magazine, the applicant was involved in the 14th annual mountain man 
rendezvous in Fort Bridger, Wyoming. See exhibit D-2. 
Based upon the testimony of all of the witnesses at the hearing and 
the evidence presented, and good cause appearing herein the Administrative Law 
Judge issues the following supplemental ruling: 
SUPPLEMBHTAL COHCLUSIOHS OF LAW: 
The Administrative Law Judge hereby finds that the applicant in this 
matter, Mark D. Letham, is not entitled to Utah workers compensation benefits 
as the result of an alleged industrial incident occurring on either March 19, 
1985, or February 10, 1986. 
Based upon the preponderance of the evidence presented at the hearing 





rules that the applicant did not sustain a compensable industrial accident on 
March 19, 1985, or February 10, 1986. The Administrative Law Judge rules that 
the applicant* s claim for benefits arising out of or in the course of 
employment on these dates are not credible or trustworthy. This ruling is 
based upon the findings of fact contained in the original Order dated November 
3, 1987, and that the record clearly establishes that the credibility of the 
applicant's claim for benefits is not credible and not trustworthy. 
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant's claim for additional 
temporary total disability and/or permanent partial disability compensation 
shall be, and the same is hereby, denied. Compensation and medical benefits 
are denied on the basis that the applicant's claim is not credible or 
trustworthy, and that the applicant did not sustain a viable industrial 
accident on either March 19, 1985, or February 10, 1986. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing 
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof, 
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so 
filed, this- Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
Gilbert A. Martinez 
Administrative Law Ju 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
r2-7^ ft day of January, 1988. 
ATTEST: 
/s/ Linda J. Strasburg 
Linda J, s£rasb*jrfc~" 
Commission Secretary 
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On November 3, 1987, an Administrative Law Judge of the Industrial 
Commission Issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order denying the 
applicant in the above-captioned case additional temporary total compensation 
and permanent partial impairment benefits for two back injuries alleged to 
have occurred on March 19, 1985 and February 10, 1986. The Application for 
Hearing indicates a claim for additional temporary total compensation from 
approximately the beginning of June 1987 until the applicant returned to work 
in August 1987, plus a claim for perma.tiant partial impairment benefits based 
on the treating physician's rating of 15% whole person. The Administrative 
Law Judge based his denial of these additional benefits on the .fact that the 
applicant was clearly not temporarily totally disabled as of May 1987, and 
quite possibly stabilized much earlier than that date, resulting in an 
overpayment of temporary total compensation. The November 3, 1987 Order 
points to a video tape of the applicants activities, taken by the defendant 
in May 1987, as being the most influential evidence convincing the 
Administrative Law Judge an overpayment had occurred. The video tape showed 
the applicant involved in extremely strenuous physical activity such as 
unloading a truck, carrying very heavy items, setting up a 20 ft. teepee, 
shoveling dirt, running and climbing and hauling large buckets of water. 
Based on the fact the applicant engaged in these activities while receiving 
temporary total compensation and representing to the professionals treating 
him that he was in pain and/or restricted in mobility, the Administrative Law 
Judge found the applicant's claim for further benefits as not supported by the 
facts and the Administrative Law Judge therefore denied the applicant's 
claim. 
On January 5, 1988, counsel for the applicant filed a Motion for 
Review arguing that the Administrative Law Judge's denial of benefits resulted 
from the Administrative Law Judge ignoring certain evidence. Counsel for the 
applicant argues that the Administrative Law Judge ignored the applicant's 
testimony as well as the medical evidence. Per counsel for the applicant, the 
medical evidence reflect that the applicant was not stable during the period 
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of time at issue. With respect to the applicant's activities as reproduced in 
the video tape, counsel for the applicant finds these activities are 
non-strenuous and counsel for the applicant argued only a medical panel can 
determine whether the activities were such that a finding of temporary total 
disability is inconsistent with those activities. 
On January 27, 1988, the Administrative Law Judge issued a 
Supplemental Order indicating that besides the fact that no further 
compensation is due the applicant, the Administrative Law Judge determined 
there was no compensable accident on either March 19, 1985 or February 10, 
1986. Once again, the Administrative Law Judge cited the applicant's lack of 
credibility as the reason behind his conclusions. On January 29, 1988, 
counsel for the defendant/Workers Compensation Fund filed a Response to the 
applicant's Motion for Review. Counsel for the Workers Compensation Fund 
states that the Administrative Law Judge correctly listed in his Order just 
those facts upon which he relied on reaching his decision. As the 
Administrative Law Judge did not cely on the applicant's testimony, which the 
Administrative Law Judge found to be non-credible, counsel for the Workers 
Compensation Fund states it was not necessary for the Administrative Law Judge 
to reiterate in his Order what the applicant testified to at hearing. 
Furthermore, counsel for the Workers Compensation Fund states that the 
Administrative Law Judge did not rely on the medical records indicating 
medical instability as it is clear the applicant misrepresented to the medical 
care providers as well as to the insurance carrier. Finally, counsel for the 
Workers Compensation Fund states that the rating of Dr. Heilbrun does not 
require that the Industrial Commission award permanent partial impairment 
benefits. Dr. Heilbrun's rating is based on the American Medical 
Association's Guides to the Evaluations of Permanent Impairment and counsel 
for the Workers Compensation Fund states that publication is merely a guide. 
As the applicant's impairment is obviously minimal as demonstrated by the 
activities he is able to, and does perform, counsel for the Workers 
Compensation Fund states no impairment rating or benefits are warranted. 
The Commission finds that the issue on review is whether the 
applicant is entitled to further workers compensation benefits beyond what has 
already been paid. The Commission notes it is clear from the file that the 
Workers Compensation Fund has already paid substantial compensation, including 
nearly a year and a half of temporary total compensation and medical expenses 
related to two separate surgeries. The Commission agrees with the 
Administrative Law Judge that, per the video tape, temporary total 
compensation was paid at a time when the applicant was clearly medically 
stable. The Commission also agrees that the medical evidence that has been 
submitted is somewhat unreliable as the applicant clearly was misrepresenting 
to the doctor or doctors involved as to what his true physical condition was. 
However, the Commission does not agree with the Administrative Law Judge's 
Supplemental Order that there is no compensable accident involved here. The 
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March 19, 1985 industrial accident is fairly well documented. The February 
10, 1986 industrial accident is questionable. Presuming that there is at 
least one compensable industrial accident involved, some of the benefits paid 
were most likely legitimate . However, it is clear there was an overpayment 
of temporary total compensation during a period of time when the applicant had 
to be medically stable. The Commission agrees with counsel for the Workers 
Compensation Fund that the American Medical Association Guides to the 
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment are guides only and the Commission feels 
that the activities the applicant is able to perform prevent any finding that 
the applicant is permanently impaired. Even if a minimal permanent impairment 
does exist, the overpayment of temporary total compensation offsets any award 
for permanent impairment warranted in this case. Therefore, the Commission 
agrees with the Administrative Law Judge's denial of further benefits in this 
case and must therefore deny the applicant's Motion for Review. 
OfcDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant's January 5, 1988 Motion 
for Review is hereby denied and the Administrative Law Judge's November 3, 
1987 Order is hereby affirmed and fina.l with further appeal to the Court of 
Appeals only within the thirty (30) day time limit as specified in U.C.A. 
35-1-83. 
Stephen M. Hadley 
Chairman 
Lenice L. Nielsen 
Commissioner 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Uiab, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
day of April, 1988. 
John/Florez 
Commissioner 
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APPENDIX 5 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 35-1-77 
35-1-77. Medical pond - Discretionary authority of 
commission to refer case - Findings and report -
Objections to report - Hearing - Expenses. 
Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for 
injury by accident, or for death, arising out of or in 
the course of employment, and where the employer 
or insurance carrier denies liability, the commission 
may refer the medical aspects of the case to a 
medical panel appointed by the commission and 
having the qualifications generally applicable to the 
medical panel set forth in section 35-2-56. The 
medical panel shall then make such study, take such 
X-rays and perform such tests, including post-
mortem examinations where authorized by the com-
mission, as it may determine and thereafter make a 
report in writing to the commission in a form 
prescribed by the commission, and also make such 
additional findings as the commission may require. 
The commission shall promptly distribute full copies 
of the report of the panel to the applicant, the 
employer and the insurance carrier by registered 
mail with return receipt requested. Within fifteen 
days after such report is deposited in the United 
States post office, the applicant, the employer or the 
insurance carrier may file with the commission ob-
jections in writing thereto. If no objections are so fil-
ed within such period, the report shall be deemed ad-
mitted in evidence and the commission may base its 
finding and decision on the report of the panel, but 
shall not be bound by such report if there is other 
substantial conflicting evidence in the case which 
supports a contrary finding by the commission. If 
objections to such report are filed the commission 
may set the case for hearing to determine the facts 
and issues involved, and at such hearing any party so 
desiring may request the commission to have the 
chairman of the medical panel present at the hearing 
for examination and cross-examination. For good 
cause shown the commission may order other 
members of the panel, with or without the chairman, 
to be present at the hearing for examination and 
, cross-examination. Upon such hearing the written 
report of the panel may be received as an exhibit but 
shall not be considered as evidence in the case except 
as far as it is sustained by the testimony admitted. 
The expenses of such study and report by the 
medical panel and of their appearance before the 
commission shall be paid out of the fund provided 




UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 35-1-88 
35-1-88. Rules of evidence and procedure be-
fore commission and hearing examiner 
— Admissible evidence. 
Neither the commission nor its hearing examiner 
shall be bound by the usual common-law or statutory 
rules of evidence, or by any technical or formal rules 
of procedure, other than as herein provided or as 
adopted by the commission pursuant to this act. The 
commission may make its investigation in such man-
ner as in its judgment is best calculated to ascertain 
the substantial rights of the parties and to carry out 
justly the spirit of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 
The commission may receive as evidence and use as 
proof of any fact in dispute all evidence deemed mate-
rial and relevant including, but not limited to the 
following: 
(a) Depositions and sworn testimony presented 
in open hearings. 
(b) Reports of attending or examining physi-
cians, or of pathologists. 
(c) Reports of investigators appointed by the 
commission. 
(d) Reports of employers, including copies of 
time sheets, book accounts or other records. 
(e) Hospital records in the case of an injured or 
diseased employee. 1965 
APPENDIX 7 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 63-46b-16 
63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or 
the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all 
final agency action resulting from formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency ac-
tion resulting from formal adjudicative proceed-
ings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review 
of agency action with the appropriate appellate 
court in the form required by the appellate rules 
of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate ap-
pellate court shall govern all additional filings 
and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the 
agency's record for judicial review of formal adjudica-
tive proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure [Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court], except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may 
stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the 
record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of pre-
paring transcripts and copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably re-
fuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or 
organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of 
law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on 
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a 
person seeking judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on 
which the agency action is based, is unconstitu-
tional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdic-
tion conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues 
requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or 
applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful pro-
cedure or decision-making process, or has failed 
to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were 
illegally constituted as a decision-making body 
or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determi-
nation of fact, made or implied by the agency, 
that is not supported by substantial evidence 
when viewed in light of the whole record before 
the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to 
the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior prac-
tice, unless the agency justifies the inconsis-
tency by giving facts and reasons that dem-
onstrate a fair and rational basis for the in-
consistency; or 




UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 3 5 - 1 - 6 5 
A ft 
35-1-65. Temporary disability — Amount of 
payments — State average weekly 
wage defined. 
(1) In case of temporary disability, the employee 
shall receive 66 2k% of that employee's average 
weekly wages at the time of the injury so long as such 
disability is total, but not more than a maximum of 
100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of 
the injury per week and not less than a minimum of 
$45 per week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 
for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up 
to a maximum of four such dependent children, not to 
exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at 
the time of the injury, but not to exceed 100% of the 
state average weekly wage at the time of the injury 
per week. In no case shall such compensation benefits 
exceed 312 weeks at the rate of 100% of the state 
average weekly wage at the time of the injury over a 
period of eight years from the date of the injury. 
In the event a light duty medical release is ob-
tained prior to the employee reaching a fixed state of 
recovery, and when no such light duty employment is 
available to the employee from the employer, tempo-
rary disability benefits shall continue to be paid. 
(2) The "state average weekly wage" as referred to 
in Chapters 1 and 2 of this title shall be determined 
by the commission as follows: on or before June 1 of 
each year, the total wages reported on contribution 
reports to the department of employment security un-
der the commission for the preceding calendar year 
shall be divided by the average monthly number of 
insured workers determined by dividing the total in-
sured workers reported for the preceding year by 
twelve. The average annual wage thus obtained shall 
be divided by 52, and the average weekly wage thus 
determined rounded to the nearest dollar. The state 
average weekly wage as so determined shall be used 
as the basis for computing the maximum compensa-
tion rate for injuries or disabilities arising from occu-
pational disease which occurred during the twelve-
month period commencing July 1 following the June 




UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 35-1-66 
35-1-66. Permanent partial disability — Scale of 
payments. 
An employee who sustained a permanent impair-
ment as a result of an industrial accident and who 
files an application for hearing under Section 35-1-99 
may receive a permanent partial disability award 
from the commission. 
Weekly payments may not in any case continue 
after the disability ends, or the death of the injured 
person. 
In the case of the following injuries the compensa-
tion shall be 662/3% of that employee's average 
weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more 
than a maximum of 662/3% of the state average 
weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and 
not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for 
a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent child 
under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four 
such dependent children, but not to exceed 662/3% of 
the state average weekly wage at the time of the in-
jury per week, to be paid weekly for the number of 
weeks stated against such injuries respectively, and 
shall be in addition to the compensation provided for 
temporary total disability and temporary partial dis-
ability, to wit: 
For the loss of: Number of Weeks 
(A) Upper extremity 
(1) Arm 
(a) Arm and shoulder (forequarter ampu-
tation) 218 
(b) Arm at shoulder joint, or above deltoid 
insertion 187 
(c) Arm between deltoid insertion and 
elbow joint, at elbow joint, or below 
elbow joint proximal to insertion of 
biceps tendon 178 
(d) Forearm below elbow joint distal to in-
sertion of biceps tendon 168 
(2) Hand 
(a) At wrist or midcarpal or 
midmetacarpal amputation 168 
(b) All fingers except thumb at metacarpo-
phalangeal joints 101 
(3) Thumb 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with 
resection of carpometacarpal bone 67 
(b) At interphalangeal joint 50 
(4) Index finger 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with 
resection of metacarpal bone 42 
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint 34 
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint 18 
(5) Middle finger 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with 
resection of metacarpal bone 34 
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint 27 
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint 15 
(6) Ring finger 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with 
resection of metacarpal bone 17 
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint 13 
For the loss of: Number of Weeks 
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint 8 
(7) Little finger 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with 
resection of metacarpal bone 8 
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint 6 
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint 4 
(B) Lower extremity 
(1) Leg 
(a) Hemipelvectomy (leg, hip and pelvis) 156 
(b) Leg at hip joint or three inches or less 
below tuberosity of ischium 125 
(c) Leg above knee with functional stump, 
at knee joint or Gritti-Stokes amputa-
tion or below knee with short stump 
(three inches or less below 
intercondylar notch) 112 
(d) Leg below knee with functional stump 88 
(2) Foot 
(a) Footatankle 88 
(b) Foot partial amputation (Chopart's) ... 66 
(c) Foot midmetatarsal amputation 44 
(3) Toes 
(a) Great toe 
(i) With resection of metatarsal bone ... 26 
(ii) At metatarsophalangeal joint 16 
(iii) At interphalangeal joint 12 
(b) Lesser toe (2nd — 5th) 
(i) With resection of metatarsal bone ... 4 
(ii) At metatarsophalangeal joint 3 
(iii) At proximal interphalangeal joint 2 
(iv) At distal interphalangeal joint 1 
(c) All toes at metatarsophalangeal joints 26 
(4) Miscellaneous 
(a) One eye by enucleation 120 
(b) Total blindness of one eye 100 
(c) Total loss of binaural hearing 100 
(C) Permanent and complete loss of use shall be 
deemed equivalent to loss of the member. Partial loss 
or partial loss of use shall be a percentage of the com-
plete loss or loss of use of the member. This para-
graph, however, shall not apply to the items listed 
[in] (B) (4). 
Permanent hearing loss caused by accident shall be 
determined and paid as follows: 
"Loss of hearing" is defined as the binaural hearing 
loss measured in decibels with frequencies of 500, 
1000, 2000, and 3000 cycles per second (cps) using 
pure tone air conduction audiometric instruments 
(ANSI 1969) approved by nationally recognized au-
thorities in the field of measurement of hearing im-
pairment^ Reduction of hearing ability in frequencies 
above 3000 cycles per second shall not be considered 
in determining compensable disability. If the average 
decibel loss at 500, 1000, 2000, and 3000 cycles per 
second is 25 decibels or less, usually no hearing im-
pairment exists. 
In measuring hearing loss, a medical panel of medi-
cal and paramedical professionals appointed by the 
commission shall measure the loss in each ear at the 
four frequencies 500, 1000, 2000, and 3000 cycles per 
second which shall be added together and divided by 
four to determine the average decibel loss. To deter-
mine the percentage of hearing loss in each ear, the 
average decibel loss for each decibel of loss exceeding 
25 decibels shall be multiplied by Vk% up to the 
maximum of 100% which is reached at 92 decibels. 
Binaural hearing loss is determined by multiplying 
the percentage of hearing loss in the better ear by 
five, then adding the percentage of hearing loss in the 
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poorer ear and dividing by six. The resulting figure is 
the percentage of binaural hearing loss. Compensa-
tion for permanent partial disability for binaural 
hearing loss shall be determined by multiplying the 
percentage of binaural hearing loss by 100 weeks of 
compensation benefits as provided in this chapter. 
Where an employee files one or more claims for hear-
ing loss the percentage of hearing loss previously 
found to exist shall be deducted from any subsequent 
award by the commission. In no event shall compen-
sation benefits be paid for total or 100% binaural 
hearing loss exceeding 100 weeks of compensation 
benefits. 
For any permanent impairment caused by an in-
dustrial accident that is not otherwise provided for in 
the schedule of losses in this section, permanent par-
tial disability compensation shall be awarded by the 
commission based on the medical evidence. Compen-
sation for any such impairment shall, as closely as 
possible, be proportionate to the specific losses in the 
schedule set forth in this section. Permanent partial 
disability compensation may not in any case exceed 
312 weeks, which shall be considered the period of 
compensation for permanent total loss of bodily func-
tion. Permanent partial disability compensation may 
not be paid for any permanent impairment that ex-
isted prior to an industrial accident. 
The amounts specified in this section are all subject 
to the limitations as to the maximum weekly amount 
payable as specified in this section, and in no event 
shall more than a maximum of 662/3% of the state 
average weekly wage at the time of the injury for a 
total of 312 weeks in compensation be required to be 
paid. 1988 
